Shaddock v. Parramatta City Council : a possible key to the problems of negligent mis-statement in New Zealand? by Briscoe, Simon Norris.


SIMON NORRIS BRISCOE 
SHADDOCK v PARRAMATTA CITY COUNCIL 
A POSSIBLE KEY TO THE 
PROBLEMS OF NEGLIGENT MIS-STATEMENT 
IN NEW ZEALAND? 
Submitted for the LLB(Hons) Degree 
at the Victoria University of Wellington 
1 September 1982 
V'I 
• z. 
• 
b' 
§ 
n -· 
• 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1) INTRODUCTION 
11) THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF NEGLIGENT 
MIS-STATEMENT. 
111) APPLICATION OF THE HEDLEY BYRNE DOCTRINE IN 
NEW ZEALAND. 
IV) 
V) 
SHADDOCK v PARRAMATTA CITY COUNCIL; ITS TREATMENT 
OF MLC v EVATT. 
SHADDOCK - ITS POSSIBLE INFLUENCE IN NEW ZEALAND 
VI) CONCLUSION 
\,/'t 
• z. 
• 
b' 
~ 
n -· 
• 
I) 
II) 
Introduction 
Tort Law has always been considered the branch of the law 
1 most ready to respond to the needs of society generally. 
A growth area in this field has been that of liability for 
negligent mis-statement causing economic loss. 
Unfortunately, this growing area of the law has hit a'Toad 
block~' In their determination of who owes a duty of care for 
statements given, the Privy Council in Mutual Life & Citizens 
2 Assurance Co. Ltd v Evatt have limited possible liability to a 
point that many conm1entators consider unreasonable. The decision 
has certainly narrowed the scope of liability envisaged by their 
Lordships in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd. 3 
Not only has it obstructed this area of the law, but it has 
also caused a measure of confusion in its application. 
It is the aim of this legal writing to examine the development 
of this area of Tort, to look at the application of the '}~C test' 
in New Zealand Courts, and then to determine whether, in the light 
4 of the recent Australian decision in Shaddock v Parramatta City Council 
it is possible co predict the future approach of the New Zealand 
Courts on this issue. 
The Development of the Doctrine of Negligent Mis-statement 
One of the primary problems to be dealt with by the Courts is 
the question of who owes a duty to take care when making statements. 
Early formulations on the principle were enunciated by 
Lord Denning as a dissenting judge in the English Court of Appeal 
d ' . f C dl C Ch . & Co S I h ec1s1on o an er v rane, r1stmas n tat case 
Lord Denning was of the opinion that a duty of care could arise if 
a sufficiently "proximate" relationship existed. 6 
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The learned judge felt that accountants, surveyors, valuers 
and analysts whose profession or occupation involved making 
reports and surveys upon which other people rely come under a 
duty of care to those people to whom they or their employers 
show the report (provided the relationship was sufficiently 
proximate). 
The idea that a duty of care arose in cases of negligent 
mis-statement did not gain House of Lords approval for another 
thirteen years. It came forth in 1964, in case of Hedley Byrne v 
Heller. 7 Their Lordships in that case, were of the opinion that 
a duty of care could arise in cases of negligent mis-statement. 
However, as Lord Ried, stated, because the effect of words may 
be unlimited in time and distance, and as liability could tend 
to arise more often in the case of words, strong reasons exist 
for the law treating negligent words differently from negligent 
8 acts. 
The House of Lords all agreed that what was important in 
establishing a duty of care was the existence of a "special 
relationship", which would create a duty of care, irrespective 
9 of contractual or fiduciary obligations. The court did not 
however, attempt to list all the situations in which this duty 
of care would arise, but it is possible to determine several 
broad requirements that allow you to determine whether or not 
such a relationship exists. Lord Morris gives a good account 
of these requirements at Page 502. 
" .•. it should now be regarded as settled that if someone 
possessed of a special skill undertakes, quite irrespective 
of contract, to apply that skill for the assistance of 
another person who relies upon such skill, a duty of care 
will arise, the fact that the service is to be given by 
means of or by the instrumentality of words can make no 
difference. Furthermore, if in a sphere in which a person 
is so placed that others could reasonably rely upon his 
judgement or his skill or upon his ability to make careful 
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enquiry, a person takes it upon himself to give 
information or advice to, or allows his information or 
advice to be passed on to, another person who, as he 
knows or should know, will place reliance upon it, then 
a duty of care will arise." 
It is then possible to draw three basic requirements for 
the existence of a duty of care. Firstly there must be some 
assumption of responsibility. This is usually assumed when 
the speaker chooses to give advice or information, but this 
assumption may be negated if the speaker expressly disclaims 
10 such responsiblity. Secondly, the reliance on the advice or 
information must be reasonable. In this context advice tendered 
during social, or informal intercourse will not usually attract 
11 a relationship of care. Lastly, the informant must reasonably 
foresee some reliance on the information or advice. 
12 
The approach in Hedley-Byrne means that the existence of a 
duty of care remains subject to the facts of the case. It is 
flexible enough to encompass a variety of possible situations 
but retains enough certainty to allow an amount of prediction 
as to the result of a clients case. It is interesting to note 
that the judges in Hedley Byrne i) did not limit a duty to 
professional or especially skilled people, ii) reserved a 
possible right of disclaimer for the adviser. 
The connnon law, however has an innate hostility towards 
doctrines that are "flexible". Certainty is the catch cry 
of the judiciary, and accordingly . it was not long before a 
judicial attempt was made to detail this area of the law. 
The case in which this occured was the High Court of Australia's 
13 decision in the case of Mutual Life & Citizens v Evatt. 
In that case, The Plaintiff, Mr Evatt was a policy holder 
in the defendant Company. He sought advice from them on the 
financial soundness of another Company, which along with the 
defendant company was a subsidary of Mutual Life Corporation Ltd. 
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The defendant's were, as a result of this relationship, in 
a better position to obtain the requested information, than 
Mr Evatt, and it had suitably trained officers, and the facilities, 
to answer the enquiry. 
On the basis of the information he received, Mr Evatt not 
only maintained his existing interest in the Company, but he also 
made further investment. Mutual Life & Citizens were negligent 
in giving the advice and information. (The reply they supplied 
was incorrect) and as a consequence Mr Evatt lost his money. 
He brought an action in an attempt to recover damages for 
the loss he suffered as a consequence of the negligent advice. 
14 
The judgment of Barwick C.J. in the High Court of Australia 
has been lauded as one of the "most important judicial discussions 
of this branch of the law since Hedley Byrne itself." 
15 
B~rwick C.J. agreed with the Hedley Byrne principle that it 
was necessary to establish a "special relationship" before a duty 
16 
of care would arise. He, also, made no attempt to define all 
the situations where such a relationship would arise, but he 
sought to define in more detaiJ. the "necessary elements" or 
features of the relationship out of which the duty of care arises.
17 
There were four basic factors that Barwick C.J. saw as 
constituting these "necessary elements". 
18 
The first was that the reasonable speaker must realise 
that he is being relied upon by the recipient to give advice or 
information which the recipient belives the speaker to have, or to 
have access to, or to be better qualified to pronounce upon. 
Secondly, the speaker must realise, or ought to realise, 
that the recipient intends to act upon the information or advice. 
Thirdly, the information or advice must be on a matter of 
business, or serious consequence. 
Fourthly, it must be reasonable in the circumstances that 
the recipient seeks or accepts, and relies upon the information 
that is given. 
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On the first point Barwick C. J. felt that an unequal 
position between the parties did not have to exist in fact 
as long as the belief held by the recipient would be reasonable. 
He was of the opinion that several other factors may be 
of assistance in determining the existence of a special relationship, 
but were not "necessary elements". 
There is no distinction, according to Barwick C. J., between 
the giving of information or advice, although in many 
circumstances the giving of information may make it harder to prove 
a special relationship (i.e. reliance may not be reasonable). 19 
The information or advice many be as a response to an inquiry 
or volunteered, so long as the necessary elements of the special 
1 · h · . f. d 20 re ations ip are satis ie . 
The advice given may apply equally to an opinion on a 
f . . · 21 d d f uture event, or on some existing circumstance, an a uty o care 
is not limited to persons of a professional nature, although the 
existence of such a professional capacity may satisfy some of the 
1 f h . 1 1 . h. 22 necessary e ements o t e specia re ations ip. 
The High Court decided in favour of Mr Evatt, but leave to 
appeal to the Privy Council was granted Mutual Life & Citizens, 
arguing before the Privy Council, contended that as their 
business did not include giving advice on investments, and because 
it had at no stage claimed the necessary skill and competence to 
do so, its duty to Mr Evatt was merely to give an honest answer. 
The majority of the Privy Council in delivering their judgment, 
chose to narrow the field of negligent mis-statement from that 
level accepted by Barwick .CJ. The majority (comprising Lord Hodson, 
Lord Guest and Lord Diplock), in a decision delivered by Lord Diplock, 
agreed with the appellants arguments, and held that a special 
relationship, and therefore a duty of care, will only arise when 
23 the advice is given by a party who has special s kill and competence. 
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This special skill and competence is normally evidenced 
by the carrying on of a business or profession which involves 
24 
giving advice of the type sought. By doing so the individual 
not only lets it be known he possesses this skill and competence, 
but also that he is willing to exercise the degree of diligence 
normally possessed and exercised by persons of that business or 
profession. 25 The statement given must be one in respect of 
h · h h b · f · · · d 
26 and the w ic tat usiness or pro ession is carrie on, 
skill or competence of the advisor in making the statement should 
be such that the advisor himself does not possess it. 
27 
Their Lordships did, however, include as giving rise to a 
special relationship, situations where the advisor although not 
carrying on that business or profession, lets it be known in some 
other way that he claims to possess a comparable level of skill 
and competence to those in a business or profession, and he is 
willing to exercise that level of skill and competence. 
28 
If the defendant, and the nature of the statement, are such 
that these criteria are satisfied then a duty of care will arise. 
The majority also emphasised that if the circumstances are such 
that a reasonable person would realise that the adviser was not 
prepared to exercise the degreee of diligence he would in his 
professional or business capacity then there is no duty. Thus, 
casual advice given by a professional on a social or informal 
. ld · 1 1 · h · 29 occasion wou not create a specia re ations ip. 
Mr Evatts case failed, their Lordships decided, because 
of a "fatal gap" in his presentation.There was no allegation 
by Mr Evatt that the Company had claimed to possess the necessary 
skill and competence to answer his enquiry, or that they were 
prepared to exercise the necessary diligence to give him reliable 
advice on the subject matter of his enquiry. The Company was 
30 
therefore under no obligation to do more than give an honest answer. 
In closing the Privy Council emphasised the fact that Hedley Byrne 
was not intended to lay down the 
field of negligence which was emerging. The limits are, th·..!y said, 
to be decided step by step, according to the facts of the cases as 
they came before the courts. Their Lordships felt that situations 
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may arise where the"missing characteristic" in relationships 
where a duty of care is sought to exist may well be non-essential. 
The example they gave was where the adviser has a financial 
interest in the transaction upon which he give his advice. 
According to Lord Diplock, "The categories of negligence 
are never closed and their Lordships opinion in the instant 
appeal, like all judicial reasoning, must be understood 
31 "secundum subjectam materiam" (according to the subject matter)" 
The minority of Lords Ried and Morris disagreed with this 
" k · 11 · . 1 " 
32 
I h · · · . "bl s i princip e. n t eir opinion, it was not possi e to 
determine set principles governing when a duty of care arises, 
which was what the majority were attempting to do, but that it 
was possible, and necessary, to determine the ·general principles 
to be applied to varying circumstances.
33 
They agreed that no special relationship occurs when advice 
is given casually or in a social context, but that it was going 
too far to say that a duty of care could only exist when advice 
is sought or given at a business or professional level, for there 
might be unusal 
the principle. 
circumstances requiring a wider application of 
34 
In their judgment, if an inquirer consults a business man and 
makes it plain that he is seeking considered advice and that he 
intends to act upon that advice, then that businessman, in 
choosing to answer without any warning or qualification, puts 
himself within the principles established in Hedley Byrne, and 
in giving such advice he creates on himself a legal duty to to take 
h · bl · h · 35 sue care as is reasona e in t e circumstances. 
It would appear then from the minority judgment that although 
some skill and competence is necessary on the part of the adviser, 
the level possessed by him/her that they would require, would 
not be as hi.gh as that expressed by the majority (i.e. not to that 
of a professional.) 
Their Lordships felt that the test given in the majority 
decision was such that it created a "distinction that a specially 
skilled man must exercise care l:>ut a less skilled ma n need not do so
1136 
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Indeed, the majority decision seems to be placing a premium on 
a lack of skill as a way of avoiding liability. 
III) Application of the Hedley Byrne "doctrine" in New Zealand 
There have been a number of Hlgh Court decisions dealing with 
this aspect of Tort Law in New Zealand, but to an extent many 
of these cases appear to be inconsistent in application of the 
law. It is generally conceded in these judgments that the 
majority test of the Privy Council in MLC is the one the 
New Zealand Courts are obliged to follow.37 The problems flowing 
from this decision are widely discussed in a variety of articles 
but I wi ll in this paper exami ne them with parti cular ref erence to 
the application of the MLC test in New Zealand. 
The t e st in MLC is usually cons idered a reversion to the 
narrower field of liability first po s tulated by Lord Denning 
in Candl e r v Crane, Christmas & Co. It would appear on the 
face of it that liability for negli gent mis-statement will be 
limited strictly to professionals and business people, or 
individuals holding themselves out as having similar or equal 
skill and competence as professional or business people, 
in a particular area, who indicate they are prepared to exercise 
that skill and competence to the requisite level. The New Zealand 
Courts have in the main been reluctant to construe the ambit of 
liability so narrowly. 
One of the ways they have attempted to avoid doing so is 
to interpret "business" as having a wider meaning than it would 
normally (and perhaps than was intended). 
In the case of Richardson v Norris Smith 38 Beattie J, as 
he then was, held that the business of being a land agent was one 
that called for special skill and competence and therefore was 
sufficient to satisfy the test in MLC . 39 
V 
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Similarly in Capital Motors 
40 
v Beecham , Cooke J, as he 
then was, held that a car salesman acting in the course of his 
employment was within the MLC test, especially as the information 
he gave to the plaintiff was a kind that he was particularly 
competent to give. 
However, if business was intended to encompass the employee 
acting in the course of his/her employment then the decision 
42 
in Pluuuner Allinson v Avery may present an anomaly. In that case 
Chilwell J. held that an insurance clerk passing on information in 
response to an inquiry he had undertaken to answer, did not incur 
liability because that task was not one that required special 
skill and competence beyond that possessed by the ordinary insurance 
company employee. Chilwell J. apparently choose to ignore the 
possibility that a clerk for an insurance company may have some 
special skill and competence particular to that employment (as a clerk). 
This de cision could then be seen as limiting liability to business 
people in the "narrow" sense of the word. Chilwell J. would seem to 
be discounting the possibility that a person acting in the course of 
his/her employment might be under a duty of care, unless he/she is of 
a professional capacity. 
In my opinion, however, it is likely that Chilwell J did not 
in fact intend to create such a narrow distinction. The situation 
that the Insurance clerk was merely passing information, on which 
he had no specialist knowledge, did not in Chilwell J's opinion 
constitute an exercise of special skill or competence relevant 
to his employment - i.e. it was not a skill related to the employment 
as a clerk. As Chilwell J says "Any normally intelligent diligent 
insurance company employee handling an insurance claim, such as 
43 the one in hand, could pass on the information "(emphasis added)" 
The effect of Chilwell J's decision is, with respect, one leading 
to a number of absurd consequences. 
C 41 As D. W. M Lauchlan says, under this decision "no person 
whether professional or otherwise, can be liable for careless 
statements the subject matter of which calls for no competence beyond 
~hat possessed by the ordinary reasonable man, e.g. statements of 
bare fact requiring no explanation or interpretation, and the imparting 
of information which the speaker has in his possession or to which he 
w 
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has no special access." 
Do the other New Zealand cases support the result that 
Plurmner-Allinson achieves - do they limit liability to advice 
or information requiring some special explanation or interpretation, 
or can the passage of simple information also create a duty of care? 
In MLC the majority of the Privy Council suggested that on 
the facts of the case no distinction needed to be drawn between 
information and advice, but that in MLC's case the inquiry called 
for the adviser to exercise special skill and competence in the 
subject matter of the advice, and that special skill and competence 
extended to the selection of the particular facts (information) 
which needed to be ascertained in order to form a reliable 
. d 45 JU gment-. 
The decision itself therefore leaves open the question whether 
the passage of simple information incurs a duty , but it indicates 
that such statements must require the exercise of some special skill 
and competence. Cooke J. in Capital Motors appears to accept this 
idea. He was of the opinion that if the information given is of 
such a nature that the speaker is particularly competent to give 
46 it then a duty of care will arise. The approach of Cooke J., 
may, however, be wider than the majority in MLC intended, as in 
Capital Motors the information given was such that the party 
requesting it could of obtained the infonnation himself, a course 
not open to Mr Evatt in MLC. 
Cooke J's interpretation is supported by Beattie Jin 
Richardson v Norris Smith, where the learned judge found that 
even though subsequent inquiries by the plaintiff could have 
found the information requested of the defendant there was no 
47 reason to bar the plaintiffs claim. 
The judges in both these cases placed great emphasis on the 
fact that the defendants undertaking to answer the inquiry was 
what probably stopped the Plaintiff from making investigations of 
his own. This idea appea~s to be in sympathy with the importance of 
assumption of responsibility by the defendant as emphasised in 
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Hedley Byrne MLC, however, would appear to have rejected this 
element as important in creating a special relationship, unless 
coupled with some relevant skill and competence. As we have 
seen these decisions also appear to be contrary to Plummer Allinson, 
where a clerk (who we assume had some skill or competence) on 
undertaking to answer an inquiry was under no duty of care. 
Spreight Jin his decision in AGH Finance Ltd v Adolph 48 
would also support Chilwell J. He was of the opinion that an 
action for mis-representation failed because the information 
requested by the plaintiff was of such a nature that it could 
have been determined by the plaintiff making his own inquiries, 
and therefore there was no need for him to rely upon the defendant. 
It would appear then that the Law in New Zealand on this point 
is divided. Even adopting the wider interpretation, if the subject 
matter of the inquiry is simple information obtainable through 
further independant investigation, it will be necessary to establish 
the exercise of some special skill and competence. This result 
seems absurd. There exists situations where one party will rely on 
that particular information because the speaker gave it and in 
many of these cases such reliance and lack of further inquiry will 
be quite reasonable. Most of this difficulty leads from the problem 
of construing thenature of the "skill and competence" necessary under 
the MLC test. 
Cooke J. seems to feel that particular competence in itself 
is sufficent, while Chilwell J, would seem to require skill and 
competence. A literal interpretation of competence would indicate 
ability or capacity to deal with the subject of the inquiry, and 
if this is the case then surely the task undertaken by the insurance 
clerk was one requiring some competence. Chilwell J. was of the 
opinion that it required no special skill and competence beyond that 
possessed by the ordinary man. 49 On this analysis then Cooke J 
decision in Capital Motors is at variance with MLC - the information 
on the Motor vehicles ownership was equally accessible to the 
ordinary man. It is my opinion that the task of contacting a 
Company handling such inquiries
50 
, instigating such investigation 
and then reporti:1g back the findings undertaken by the insurance clerk 
in Plumrner-Allinson did involve some competence (certainly special 
knowledge) not possessed by the ordinary man. 
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Chilwell J's interpretation of the skill and competence 
requirement is, in terms of justice and practicality, too narrow. 
Part of this leads from the sunnnary of MLC Chilwell J. adopted, from 
the judgement of Asprey JA in the Australian case of Presser v 
51 
Cauldwell Estates . Asprey J.A. attempted to define, in the 
narrowest possible terms, the "metes and bounds" 
of Hedley Byrne as laid out in MLC. 
These "metes and bounds" have also been adopted by 
52 Davidson .C.J. in Meates v A.G. , and applied as the limit of 
the Hedley Byrne doctrine. This approach serves to limit the 
possible development of this field of the law, something that 
even the Privy Council in MLC denied they were doing. 
The MLC test, having been accepted into New Zealand, causes 
an amount of confusion in the area of liability for non-professional's, 
but does it at least provide clear guidelines for establishing 
liability for people who are within the criteria of business of 
professional people? 
As Lords Morris and Reid pointed out in their minority 
decision in MLC. it may be difficult to determine whether or not 
an individuals advice is given within the context of his profession 
or business. The example they gave was where a professional gives 
advice on an area of this profession with which he is not 
particularly conversant "Even a man with a professional qualification 
is seldom an expert on all matters dealt with by members of that 
53 profession." 
Another possible situation that may lead to problems is where 
the individual assumes "two hats" - for example where he is a 
charted accountant and a small businessman. If he gives advice as a 
businessman, that utilises his skills as an accountant, is he under 
a duty of care? 
These are two possible difficulties arising out of "professional" 
and certainly not the only ones. In New Zealand the issue of 
determining when an individual is working within his/her professional 
capacity, has not received a clear definition. 
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In the decision in Day v Ost Cooke J. appears to have 
taken the position that whenever an advisor gives a statement 
on a matter concerning his/her business he/she comes under a 
duty to take care. In that case Cooke J. held that an architect 
giving advice to a tradesman working on the same building site 
on the financial status of the Company for whom they were both 
working had a duty of care in answering the inquiry. As the 
defendant was working in the course of his professional capacity 
as architect on the project, he had let it be known to the 
plaintiff that he had the necessary skill and competence to answer 
h · · 55 I h h f 1 t e inquiry. t seems strange tat a person w ose pro essiona 
capacity as architect qualifies him to give advice on the financial 
status of a Company by whom he is employed. 
On another extreme is Davidson C.J. decision in Meates v A.G., 
where he held that a Government minister pledging state support 
to a financially unstable company, in a press statement, was not 
making a statement in the ordinary course of his business or 
profession, and was not exercising any skill, competence or 
56 qualification not possessed by the ordinary reasonable man. 
It is obvious then, from these two cases, that some difficulty 
arises in determining what constitutes an action within a business 
or professional capacity. It is likely this difficulty arises 
because of the nature of the question itself, and is therefore not 
capable of some hard and fast definition. This increases the 
uncertainty surrounding the MLC decision. 
The last question raised by the Privy Council decision in MLC 
is the position of the adviser who has a financial interest in the 
transaction on which he/she give advice. There appears to be 
two current interpretations of this situation. 
In Plurruner Allinson, Chilwell J. was of the opinion that the 
financial interest must be such as to allow an implication to be 
drawn that the adviser has some special skill and competence relevant 
h . . d . 57 tote inquiry or a vice. 
This interpretation of the financial interest situation is 
such as to give it very limited application. The only time such 
interest is likely to arise is in cases where a book keeper employed 
.., 
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by a company gives advice on its financial status, or some 
58 similar situation. 
The other possible approach to the "financial interest" 
is that is forms a true exception to the"skill principle." 
In Capital Motors and in Richardson both judges felt that a 
direct commission upon the sale of the subject of the 
mis-representation (be it a motor vehicle or realty) may be an 
59 important indication of a duty of care. In Day v Ost 
Cooke J. felt that the fact the defendants fees were dependent 
upon the completion of the building would have been such as to 
allow him to infer a duty of care, although in that case there 
was no ~eed to do so because the other elements creating a duty 
60 were satisfied. 
The actual effect of a "financial interest" is another of the 
questions raised in this area of the law that will need resolving 
in the future, along with a number of inconsistencies. Until we 
have a Court of Appeal decision on this branch of Tort or until 
another appeal to the Privy Council is heard this area will 
remain uncertain. It is obvious that members of the New Zealand 
judiciary are in disagreement on the application of the fundamental 
principles basic to the MLC test. 
It is possible, however, to determine the approximate position 
61 of the New Zealand law on negligent mis-statement as a Tort 
in-so-far as it now stands? 
It is my submission that several broad propositions can be 
drawn: 
i) So long as the business or profession engaged in requires some 
special skill or competence then the MLC test will be satisfied, 
providing the statement is in respect of that business or profession. 
ii) If the subject matter of the statement made entails the use 
of some special skill or competence relevant to the ordinary 
employment of the speaker, ones not possessed by the ordinary person, 
then a duty of care may arise regardless of whether or not that 
employment is a professional one. 
...,, 
• z. 
• 
< • 
b' 
§ 
n -· 
• 
15 
iii) If there is no skill or competence attached to either the 
employment or the subject matter of the advice or information, 
then the MLC test cannot be satisfied and no duty of care will 
arise. 
The main difficulties I see arising in the application of the 
MLC test are: 
i) What are the necessary requirements of the "skill principle -
skill and competence or skill or competence? 
ii) Does the duty of care extend to simple information, that 
although requiring some competence in collection and giving, 
is accessible to either party? 
iii) What is the requisite level of skill and/or competence -
expert in the specific area, or a professional in that 
general occupation or a professiona l acting in the course 
of his/her business? 
iv) What is the position of the adviser with a financial interest -
indication of special skill and competence or a true exception? 
It appears to me that apart from the difficulties of application 
that arise, the present position of the law in New Zealand exhibits a 
number of social and legal drawbacks. 
Firstly, the MLC test limits liability to an extent that,in 
many cases, will be unjust and unreasonable. 
Under the"skill principle" people not possessing some 
special skill and competence will not be under any duty of care 
in imparting information, but there exist a number of situations 
where information and even advice will be imparted by individuals 
without the necessary exercise of some special skill and competence 
(for example Bank tellers, giving account balances from a Banks 
ledgers) and that information or advice will be of significant 
consequence. 
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To refuse liability when these people do so negligently is absurd. 
Such a stance will deny recovery to those who have suffered loss 
and who may well deserve some compensation. It may also have 
some undesirable consequences, in that such piople, knowing they 
are under no legal obligation to take care, may be less diligent 
than they would be knowing they could be liable for their 
negligent acts. 
Secondly, it seems unreasonable that non-professionals and 
people not claiming some special skill and competence will be 
absolved of liability, even though they may have voluntarily 
undertaken to make an inquiry or give advice, knowing that they 
were to be relied upon by the recipients, in circumstances where 
such reliance is quite reasonable. In situations like this it 
is likely, and reasonable that such undertakings will also preclude 
the recipient from taking steps to determine the facts themselves. 
62 It has been suggested that the Privy Council in MLC 
sought to limit liability to this e x tent for a number of 
undisclosed policy reasons. 
One policy reason suggested was that the majority in the 
Privy Council were attempting to put liability on the shoulders 
of those best equipped to handle it. Business and professional 
people are more likely to have malpractice insurance and if not 
are probably better suited financially to meet claims against 
them. 
A variety of reasons can also be given to negate these 
policy reasons: i) Usually the individual giving the advice 
does not suffer the direct burden of the liability, it is met 
by the employer (i.e. the Insurance Company in Plummer Allinson 
and Capital Motors in Capital Motors) 
ii) Tort law should not be aimed at protecting 
those people making and giving negligent advice, but rather at 
compensating those who suffer loss as a result of another negligence. 
MLC tends to limit the boundaries of this area of tort law 
63 (something the judges in Hedley Byrne deemed to be unwise) 
and has been construed as defiaing the boundaries of liability. 
Tort law has always been responsvie to the needs of society and with 
this in mind I now turn to Shaddock v Parramatta City Council 64 
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to examine how it may aid us in returning the law to a more 
just and equitable position. 
IV) Shaddock v Parramatta City Council: Its treatment of MLC 
The judgment in Shaddock contains two different approaches to 
the problems posed by MLC . The majority comprising Mason J, 
Aickin J and Murphy J rejected the MLC test outright, Mason J 
and Aickin J choosing to apply Barwick CJ "necessary elements" 
test, while Murphy J applied criteria similar to those expressed 
in MLC, as being adequate for the purposes of the Appeal. 
The minority of Gibbs CJ and Stephen J held MLC to be 
limited "secundum subjectarn materiam", and then analysed the 
position of the law in the factual situation they were dealing with. 
The appeal arose from the following. The plaintiff's 
solicitor made two inquiries as to whe ther or not land which his 
client wished to purchase was affected by any road widening proposals. 
One inquiry was made over the telephone and was answered in the 
negative. The other inquiry was app ended to an application for a 
certificate under S342 A of the Local Government Act 1919 (NSW) 
regarding proposed planning schemes. The Council had a statutory 
duty to give the certificate but it was under no such obligation to 
answer the secondary inquiry. It was, however, the Council's 
practice to endorse the certificate issued under S342A if the 
answer was affirmative, but not to do anything if the answer was 
negative. The Council returned the certificate without the 
endorsement, when in fact the land was to be zoned for development. 
The High Court held that the practice of the Council in not 
endorsing the Certificate, was such that failure to do so in this 
d 1 . . 65 Th . case constitute a neg 1gent m1s-statement. e question 
then to be answered was "whether there was a duty to answer carefully 
the questions put to the Council orally and in writing". 
66 
Two of the judges in the High Court (Gibbs C.J. and Stephen J) 
were of the opinion that even if the views of the majority in MLC 
were accepted a duty of care would still arise. 
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Gibbs C.J. was of the opinion that although the High Court 
of Australia was free to reject the decision in MLC, it was 
"desirable to follow the exmaple already set by the House of Lords 
and the Judicial Committee, and to avoid attempting to lay down 
67 comprehensive rules, but rather to proceed cautiously, step by step". 
On that basis Gibbs C.J. declined to choose outright between 
the two conflicting views in MLC and instead applied the MLC 
rules as being secundum subjectam materiam. As the Privy Council 
did not deal with the idea of a public body in the practice of 
giving information of which it is possessed in its public duties, 
he then went on to examine how the rules in MLC would apply in 
h f 1 
. . 68 tat actua situation. 
In principle the learned judge drew no distinction between 
a person carrying on the business of giving advice and a public 
body which in the exercise of its public function is in the 
practice of supplying information. 
"A public body," said Gibbs C. J. ," by following the practice 
of supplying information upon which the recipients are likely 
to rely for serious purposes, let it be knovm that it is 
willing to exercise reasonable skill and diligence in ensuring 
that the information supplied is accurate" 
69 
(emphasis added). 
"However," he concluded on this point," even if diligence only 
and not skill were required, a public body might be specially competent 
to supply material which it had in its possession for the purposes of 
its public functions 1169 (emphasis added). 
This approach by Gibbs C.J. is really applying the MLC test 
of skill and competence by extending it to fit a different set of facts. 
Stephen J. took an even broader approach to the statement that MLC 
must be read "secundum subjectam materiam". He considered that the 
decision in MLC was only dealing with a case where there was no 
allegation that the plaintiff knew the advisor carried on the business 
of giving advice of the type sought or that the advisor ciaimed to 
possess the necessary skill and competence to give such advice, and 
was prepared to exercise the diligence necessary to do so 
71 
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(This was the "fatal gap" in Mr Evatts case) According to Stephen J. 
the concern of the Privy Council was therefore with what might be 
inferred from the conduct of those engaged in a business or profession 
as to holding themselves out as being capable of giving such advice. 
It was in this context, says Stephen J, that the Privy Council 
formulated the two elements necessary for a duty of care - the 
possession of skill or competence as was necessary to give the advice, 
and a willingness to put that skill or competence at the disposal of 
72 
others. 
As he points out, "their Lordships were careful, on more than one 
occasion, to make it clear that it was no hard and fast rule which they 
were enunicating," and that in fact the MLC decision was only 
"one step in the step by step ascertainment of the limits of the new area 
opened by Hedley Byrne. " 
Stephen J. did not interpret their Lordships judgment as being in 
any way intended to suggest that only those engaged in particular 
trades or professions may attract a duty of care. The necessary 
element the judges in MLC found was absent was a "holding out", 
by the advisers, that they were capable of giving the information 
sought. In other contexts, apart from carrying on the business or 
profession of giving advice of the type sought, conduct of a different 
k . d ff" 73
 in many su ice. 
Conduct such as setting up a system of information collection and 
collation,possession of special knowledge over which a monopoly is 
held, and a willingness to distribute that information, was in Stephen J•s 
view, such as to constitute a "holding out" . This was the position 
of the council, he decided, and was, consistently with MLC's majority, 
74 
enough to attract a duty of care. 
As a necessary consequence of the line of reasoning, adopted by 
both Gibbs CJ and Stephens J, it was necessary for them to examine 
whether or not there was a distinction between the giving of advice 
or information with regard to the duty of care. 
Gibbs CJ rejected such a distinction on the basis that it was one 
that the Privy Council had not intended to draw, that the High Court 
of Australia and the English Court of Appeal had rejected that 
distinction and that it was not valid because often the giviPg of 
information necessitated the use of special skill, diligence and 
75 
competence. 
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Stephen J condemmed such a distinction as not only unintended by 
the Privy Council, but one unnecessary in principle and likely to 
lead to insoluble problems in practice. Even if providing information 
did not require special skill or competence in some cases, this 
did not automatically preclude a duty of care, as this aspect was 
not subject to the facts of MLC - the Privy Council were only 
dealing with an act requiring special skill and competence, therefore 
it was impossible to attach their principles to such a different 
76 
factual position. 
On this basis, even if the Parramatta City Council had no special 
skill and/or competence in marshalling and having available 
its store of information, there is no reason to assume that on the 
facts of the case no duty of care arose (even according to MLC). 
The three judges constituting the majority in the decision of 
Shaddock rejected the decision in MLC and I now turn to examine 
why and how they did so. 
Justice Mason was of the opinion that Lord Diplock had formulated 
a principle of "General application", one that could not be put 
aside as a judgement which 
"though dealing with the liability of those who. have an 
objection to bring to bear skill and competence in the provision 
of advice and information, acknowledged that there is a general 
liability for negligent mis-statement on the part of others 
78 who do not possess or profess to possess skill and competence." 
It was his belief that liability in this field was limited by MLC to 
business or professional people possessing some special skill or 
competence or someone professing to have a comparable level of skill or 
competence, except perhaps in the situation of the financial interest 
exception. 
He completely rejected the unexpressed policy basis on which the 
majority in the Privy Council grounded their reasoning. Although it 
may in some circumstances be better to limit liability to those who 
can best afford it, there are, he suggests, str0nger reasons for 
rejecting this premise, especially in the area of negligent mis-statement 
causing economic loss. 
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It denies~ remedy to those who sustain serious loss 
at the hands of those who are not members of the limited 
class who may be liable, but whose conduct is. negligent. 
It ignores the availability of insurance against liability. 
It provides no logical basis for excluding people who, 
though lacking special skill and competence, assume a 
responsibility to give advice or information to others 
on a serious matter which may occasion loss or damage. 
It is well established that economic loss not consequent 
upon property damage, may be recoverable from th~se 
whose negligence occasions it. 
79 
For these reasons he chose to reject the MLC majority test 
altogether. He was able to do so because of the case of 
Viro v The Queen 
80
, where the Australian High Court d e cided that 
since the commencement of the Privy Council (App e als from the 
High Court) Act 1975 it was not bound by any decisions of the 
Privy Council. 
In Viro Mason J. turned to, and emphasised the recognition 
awarded by the Privy Council, in Australian Consolidated Press Ltd 
81 
v Uren , to the fact that the common law may develop differently 
in Australia from the Common Law in England and other countries in 
which an appeal may lie to the Privy Council. In reliance of this 
recognition Mason J was of the opinion that it fell upon the High 
Court of Australia to determine what the law of its own nation was. 
The judges in Shaddock therefore holding themselves not be 
bound, proceeded determine what test to apply. Mason J, with the 
approval of Aickin J selected the most appropriate test as being the 
one laid out by Barwick CJ in the Australian High Court decision in 
MLC. One of the main reasons for selecting this test was that it 
did not confine liability to those who carry on a business or a 
f 
. 82 
pro ession. 
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In applying Barwick CJ's criteria to the facts of 
Shaddock, Mason J held that "the specialised nature of the 
information, the importance which it has to an owner or 
intending purchaser and the fact that it concerns what the 
authority proposes to do in the exercise of its public 
functions and powers, form a solid base for saying that 
when information (or advice) is sought on a serious matter, 
in such circumstances that the authority realises, or 
ought to realise, that the enquirer intends to act upon it, 
a duty of care arises in relation to the provision of the 
information and advice." 83 
Although Murphy J chose to reject MLC as the necessary test 
he did not follow Mason Jin nominating Barwick CJ's necessary elements. 
"For the purposes of this appeal" he said, "it is enough to hold that 
liability extends to those whose profession or business it is to give 
advice or information whether gratuitously or not." 
Shaddock - its possible influence in New Zealand. 
How can Shaddock assist the New Zealand courts in the resolution 
of the difficulties posed by the decision in MLC v Evatt? 
Although the decision in Shaddock is not one that has any 
binding authority on the New Zealand Courts, it may as persausive 
authority, or by the use of inference from judicial reasoning, have 
some positive influence in deciding a case on this issue. The decision 
is not significant as much for the test of a duty of care that it 
applies, as for the way it handles MLC as regards that decisions 
authority. 
In Shaddock two judges decide MLC when read "secundum 
subjectam materiam" is as a strict test limited to only certain types 
of case. Accordingly, when deciding a case of a different nature, 
different criteria will be taken into account, while doing so remains 
consistent with the decision in the House of Lords. 
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The other three judges were of the opinion that MLC was 
not binding on the Australian High Court and could therefore be 
rejected completely. Two of them (Mason J. and Aickin J) 
chose to abandon the House of Lords test entirely and instead 
reverted to the High Court decision of Barwick C.J. 
Are either of these alternatives viable in New Zealand? 
The second alternative has been discussed in the New Zealand context 
84 in an article by LL Stevens. He was of the opinion that as an 
appeal from Australia to the Privy Council it was not binding on the 
New Zealand Courts, as it is a decision from another jurisdiction. 
He cites as authority for this view the decision mentioned in 
Viro - Australian Consolidated Press v Uren. Unfortunately I am 
unable to construe Uren as providing any such authority. Although 
the Privy Council recognised that the law in different Corrunonwealth 
Countries develops differently all it decided was that the High Court 
of Australia (Prior to the Privy Council (Appea ls from) Act 1975 
was not bound by a House of Lords decision. This is, I suggest, a 
very different situation to the one surrounding HLC, which concerns 
the Authority of an Australian App eal to the Privy Council. 
The Privy Council in the Uren decision, in fact implies that while 
the House of Lords may not make the law of the Commonwealth, the 
Privy Council does. 85 
Mr Stevens analysis becomes even more do1Jbtful when considered 
subject to the Privy Council decision in Bakhshuwen 
86 
VBa~~ 
which suggests that Privy Council decisions on the law one one 
jurisdiction may well be binding upon appeals from another jurisdiction. 
It would appear that although MLC is not a New Zealand Appeal 
it is of such a status as to be either binding, or so extremely 
persausive, as to be functionally binding, on our Courts. It may 
be, if a decision is only extremely persausive, that the Court of 
Appeal will reject : it .:if strong enough reasons- exist, but they 
will always bear - iti- mind the possibility that if such a decision 
is appealed the Privy Council may well support their earlier decision. 
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As Mr Stevens says, the present personnel of the N.Z.C.A 
are unlikely to fall into the category of "timorous souls" 87 
who would be constrained to apply a doctrine they disagreed with. 
However, it is my submission that the judges of the Court of Appeal 
would refrain from a course of action that would put them in a 
position of opposition to the Privy Council, if an alternative means 
of achieving a just result presented itself. 
The other possible course arising from Shaddock, that of 
reading MLC subject to the facts is one that may well find favour 
in our Court of Appeal. This approach as a possible way of dealing 
88 with MLC was raised by D.W. McLauchlan , while he was reviewing 
the decision in Plummer Allinson,where he suggested that course 
may well be open to the N.Z.C.A. 
The Court of Appeal decision of Scott Group v Macfarlane 89 
contains a number of statements made by Cooke J and Woodhouse J 
(as they then were) implying that they may well accept such an 
approach. Woodhouse J points out that the majority decision in 
the Privy Council turned on a particular application of the 
Hedley Byrne principles to the facts of the case. 9° Cooke J 
felt that both Hedley Byrne and MLC were concerned with specific 
requests for advice and that "naturally" the reasoning of their 
Lordships centred on situations of that sort." 
91 
If the Court of Appeal were to limit MLC "secundum subjectam 
materiam", what are the facts they would consider central to the 
decision, and in what situations would the MLC test not apply? 
Cooke Jin his decision in Scott Group indicates two factors 
he considers portant to MLC ; i) whether or not the defendants 
92 have held themselves out as having professional skill 
ii) whether there was a specific request for advice. 93 
Stephens J, in Shaddock, decided that in MLC the claim to 
professional skill was evidenced by the carrying on of a business 
or profession of giving advice of the type sought. This was, he 
said, a "holding out", and this claim, or rather lack of it was of 
central importance to the MLC decision. 
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It would appear that in this Cooke J would agree with him. 
D.W. McLauchlan suggests that MLC is limited to affecting the 
liability of non-professionals or persons not proclaiming special 
skill, who makes a statement requiring the exercise of such skill. 
You will then have a completely different factual situation where 
a person in the ordinary course of his bus i ne s s (or, I would add, 
employment) imparts information, the ascertainment and provision 
of which is an unskilled task. Such a limitation while, 
appearing to be acceptable in the New Zealand courts, is one 
that will avoid a number of the problems leading from the decision 
in MLC. It means Hedley Byrne will no longer be limited to 
statements requiring special skill, or to people who possess or 
profess special skill and competence. 
What, then, could the Courts use as a criteria for establishing 
a duty of care? Without presuming to anticipate any New Zealand 
decision, I would like to go on and examine the possible criterion 
laid out by Stephen J, in Shaddock. 
His honour, went on to develop the notion of "holding out" 
as the general principle from which a duty of care can be determined. 
The carrying on of a business of a particular kind wa s in his opinion 
only one way of inferring a holding out. In othe r context's conduct 
of a quite different kind may suffice. He then went on to discuss 
the position of the Council in collecting and distributing information 
of the kind sought, as being a "holding out" so as to satisfy the 
general principle on which MLC was decided. 
Application of Stephen J's reasoning means that in any 
situation where you can infer a ,·,holding out" as to capacity to 
answer an inquiry, whether or not the advisor makes a business 
or profession of supply such answers, then you can have a duty 
of care, consistently with the decision in MLC. 
How far is it possible to take this line of reasoning? 
It is my contention that it does not go far enough. The holding 
out, must, to be consistent with the facts of MLC, occur outside 
the transaction where the advice is sought or given. In MLC 
the Company undertook to answer the inquiry - yet obviously this 
assumption of responsibility was not enough to constitute a 
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"holding out" as to the capacity of the Company to answer the 
inquiry. The number of situations where a "holding out" may be 
implied from factors outside the transaction involved are limited, 
although not so much as through a strict application of the 
decision in MLC. 
I submit that the most sensible course to follow, having 
limited MLC to the facts outlined, is to return to a consideration 
of the requirements discussed in Hedley Byrne and the necessary 
elements put forward by Barwick CJ in the High Court of Australia. 
As we saw in the earlier discussion of the law in New Zealand 
there appears to be a favouring by a number of judges of 
"assumption of responsibility and reasonable reliance" as criteria 
for determining the existence of a duty of care. 
I personally advocate a "back to basic's" move, away from the 
rigm,rrs imposed by the MLC test, by limiting it to its facts, 
and a use of the general Hedley Byrne principles in an attempt to 
return this area to a step by step ascertainment of its metes and 
bounds. 
VI) Conclusion 
The decision in Shaddock is noteworthy in the respect that it 
presents two possible avenues for the resolution of the problems 
precipitated by the Privy Council decision in MLC v Evatt. 
Unfortunately, as I have endeavoured to explain, one of the possible 
routes is apparently denied to our Courts at the moment. 
The other however, presents a viable alternative. By limiting the 
MLC decision to the facts the N.Z.C.A.(and perhaps even the High Court) 
could, and would be more likely to, achieve, in a significant number 
of cases, just and equitable results presently denied in such situations 
by the decision and application of the test in MLC. 
Stephen J's approach would allow this position to be achieved 
in a manner that retains consistency with the judgment of the Privy 
Eouncil and thereby maintaining a large measure of 'certainty' in 
this area of the law. It is not a perfect solution but, I contend, 
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the New Zealand Courts would tend to down play any deficiencies 
in order to resolve the difficulties I have discussed. 
I do not consider that such decisions will alleviate all 
of the problems arising out the"Hedley Byrne doctrine", because 
as an area of developing law it is one that is bound to encounter 
problems of interpretation and implementation. It is, however, 
my belief that resolution of the difficulties posed by MLC 
will again allow this doctrine to advance in a way best calculated 
to satisfy the social and economic needs of our society. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
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